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Semantic Incommensurability and Empirical Comparability: 
The Case of Lorentz and Einstein 
Martin Carrier (Bielefeld University) 
1. Introduction 
Incommensurability is among the catchwords of later 20th century philosophy of science. 
The notion of incommensurability in the non-geometrical sense relevant here was simultaneously 
introduced by Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul K. Feyerabend in 1962 (Kuhn 1962, 103; Feyerabend
1962, 58). Kuhn conceived of incommensurability as arising from a deep-reaching conflict between 
paradigms or comprehensive theoretical traditions, a conflict supposedly transcending mere incom-
patibility. The adoption of a new paradigm entails the restructuring, as it were, of the relevant uni-
verse of discourse; the adherents of the two paradigms tend to talk past one another. In particular, 
incommensurability is intended to express that, first, disparate concepts are employed in each of the 
theories at hand, second, distinct problems are tackled, third, the suggested problem solutions are 
evaluated according to different standards, and, finally, perceptions are structured differently (Kuhn 
1962, 103-110, 148-150). Feyerabend, by contrast, focused on the “inexplicability,” that is, the 
non-translatability of a term taken from one theory into the conceptual framework of another one 
incompatible with the first (Feyerabend 1962, 52-62). 
While the initial use of the term “incommensurability” varied significantly, it came to be re-
stricted, subsequently, to two features. “Methodological incommensurability” was intended to ex-
press the claimed indeterminacy of judgment as to the comparative merits of different theoretical 
approaches. “Semantic incommensurability” was supposed to denote the non-translatability of 
statements from incompatible, strongly contrasting theories. In the following, I exclusively address 
this second notion of semantic incommensurability. This notion agrees with the one entertained by 
Feyerabend and the later Kuhn. My aim is to give a systematic reconstruction of the nature and im-
pact of semantic incommensurability. 
Underlying the conception of incommensurability is the theoretical context account of mean-
ing which both authors adopted for explaining the meaning of scientific terms in general. I try to 
show, first, that incommensurability can be reconstructed coherently on the basis of the context 
account. I present incommensurability as a consequence of this semantic theory along with the his-
torical observation that substantial theoretical revisions occur indeed. My conclusion is that incom-
mensurability qualifies as a sensible notion. Second, I defend the coherence of the notion of incom-
2mensurability by offering relevant examples. My chief case concerns the non-translatability of con-
cepts of Lorentzian electrodynamics and Einsteinian special relativity theory. This presentation is 
intended to buttress the claim that incommensurability is real and instantiated. Third, I explore the 
impact of incommensurability on empirical comparability. Incommensurability was perceived as a 
major threat to the possibility of rational theory evaluation. My aim is to dispel such worries. Inc-
ommensurable theories allow empirical comparison. The argument proceeds on the basis of the 
semantic principles adopted by Kuhn and Feyerabend. That is, given their own linguistic approach, 
incommensurability does not result in a breakdown of comparing empirical achievements of the 
theories in question. Empirical comparison does not require translation and remains largely unaf-
fected by incommensurability. 
2. Meaning, Theoretical Context, and Adequate Translation 
Kuhn and Feyerabend accept the context theory of meaning. According to this account, the 
meaning of a concept is determined by its relations to other concepts and the meaning of a state-
ment results from its integration in a network of other statements. Another way of putting this is to 
say that the use of a concept determines its meaning. What a concept means is represented by the 
way in which it is applied to different situations. The use of scientific concepts is specified by the 
laws of nature in which these concepts figure. The meaning of a concept like “electric field” is given 
by its lawful connections to related concepts such as electric current, charge or magnetic field. The 
concept “electric field” is understood if it is known, for instance, that such fields are produced by 
electric currents or variable magnetic fields and generate changes in the motion of charges, and so 
forth. Laws and theories supply a concept with a network of relations to other concepts, and this 
network determines to which situations the concept is properly applied. Such generalizations add to 
the meaning of the relevant concepts (Kuhn 1983, 576-577; Kuhn 1987, 8; Kuhn 1989, 12, 15-20; 
see also Irzik & Grünberg 1995, 297-298; Feyerabend 1962, pp. 76-81; Feyerabend 1965, 180; see 
also Papineau 1979, pp. 36-45; Sankey 1994, pp. 6-10). 
Translation in the sense relevant here concerns concepts of different theories. Translation 
requires the coordination of a linguistic item with another one taken from a different theoretical 
framework but possessing the same meaning. The understanding underlying the entire discussion of 
the incommensurability thesis is that translation needs to be precise (clumsy paraphrases don’t suf-
fice) and provide a one-to-one correlation between expressions. The latter condition does not de-
mand that one word is assigned to exactly one word; rather, coordinating strings of words with one 
another is quite legitimate. The issue is not about words but about semantic resources. It is not 
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76-77). 
On the basis of the context theory, the requirement of meaning preservation is to be inter-
preted as unchanged use. This notion of use comprehends two features which should both be re-
tained in translation. First, theoretical integration should coincide for the two items at issue. This 
applies, in particular, to the reproduction of standing inferential relations among predicates or the 
statements formed by them. After all, it is such relations that provide the context relevant to the 
ascription of meaning. For example, the sentence “the tree over there is losing its foliage” implies: 
“there is a deciduous tree.” Analogously, “Wilfried is a bachelor” entails “Wilfried is not divorced.” 
The network of such relations supplies predicates with their content; consequently, these relations 
should be preserved among supposedly synonymous expressions. Second, the conditions of applica-
tion of concepts should remain unaltered. One of the reasons why the French predicate “x roule un 
deux chevaux” is disqualified as a translation of “x loves cats” is that their conditions of application 
exhibit hardly any correlation. The two predicates are only accidentally applied to the same objects; 
they differ in meaning for this reason. Synonymous concepts should refer to the same states of af-
fairs. 
On the whole, then, the theoretical context account recognizes two chief determinants of the 
meaning of concepts. First, the inferential integration of a concept which is specified by its relations 
to other concepts. The integration of scientific concepts, in particular, is provided, among other 
things, by the relevant laws or theories. Second, the conditions of application which are determined 
by the set of situations to which a concept is thought to apply (or not to apply, respectively). To 
these two sources of meaning correspond two constraints on adequate translations. Rendering a 
concept appropriately demands, first, the preservation of the relevant inferential relations, and, sec-
ond, the retention of the conditions of application (Carrier 2001a, sec 4). 
One of Kuhn’s most prominent historical claims is that science proceeds at least sometimes 
through stages of significant and deep-reaching conceptual and theoretical alteration. There is dras-
tic theoretical change in science. This view finds its most prominent expression in Kuhn’s charac-
terization of scientific revolutions. Kuhnian revolutions are conceived as non-cumulative transitions. 
They do not involve the sustained elaboration of an accepted conceptual framework. On the con-
trary, a scientific revolution à la Kuhn consists in the revocation of fundamental principles of a dis-
cipline and their replacement by disparate ones. Furthermore, the disparity between pre- and post-
revolutionary principles prohibits any smooth integration of the former into the framework of the 
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be reconstructed as the limiting case of the post-revolutionary one (Kuhn 1962, Chap. VIII-X). 
Kuhn initially located the chief origin of theoretical disagreement in revolutionary periods in 
perceptual, methodological, and ontological changes, but later distinguished linguistic deviation as 
the crucial feature of scientific revolutions. Incommensurability or non-translatability is shifted to 
center stage (Kuhn 1983, 684; Kuhn 1987, 19-20). A theory is thought to comprise a series of 
terms that are supposed to denote natural kinds. Such kind-terms indicate what is assumed to be of 
the same kind within the theoretical framework. Kind-terms represent accepted similarity relations 
among objects or processes. Incommensurability is said to arise from the non-translatability of kind-
terms which is attributed, in turn, to divergent judgments about similarity relations (Kuhn 1993, 
315-318, 328, 336; Irzik & Grünberg 1998, 211-212). 
I wish to address Kuhnian relations of sameness in kind indirectly by examining first the re-
lations among seemingly analogous concepts from theories separated by a scientific revolution and 
by exploring the options for giving adequate translations. Kuhn recognizes that the kind-terms of a 
theory are connected to the laws of this theory (Kuhn 1987, 20; Kuhn 1993, 316-317). I will deal 
with conceptual relations first and come back to sameness in kind later. An often quoted instance of 
a Kuhnian revolution is the Einsteinian Revolution, a part of which involved the substitution of 
Hendrik Lorentz’s classical electrodynamics by Albert Einstein’s special relativity theory. This is a 
revolutionary change by any measure so that the emergence of incommensurable concepts can be 
expected—provided that incommensurability is instantiated at all. I begin by giving a brief sketch of 
the relevant theories. 
3. Shifting Theoretical Ground: The Example of the Einsteinian Revolution 
One of the characteristics of Lorentz’s electrodynamic theory was the assumption of an im-
movable ether. The ether was held to be at absolute rest; it is not displaced through the motion of 
charged bodies. But such motions produce changes in the state of the ether, and these changes 
propagate through the ether with the velocity of light. The ether mediates in this way the interaction 
between charged objects. True motion is motion with respect to the ether. The equations of elec-
trodynamics were restricted to frames at rest in the ether; they were thought not to hold for moving 
systems without adaptation. For instance, the velocity of light, as it features in Maxwell’s equations, 
was construed as its velocity relative to the ether. The measured value of this velocity should de-
pend on the motion of the observer. However, no such dependence was found empirically. After 
Michelson and Morley had shown with high numerical precision in 1887 that no effect of the 
Earth’s motion on the velocity of light was detectable, Lorentz (following Fitzgerald) introduced 
5his contraction hypothesis. The length of a moved body in the direction of motion shrinks to such a 
degree that the change in the velocity of light induced by the motion is precisely compensated—as 
the Michelson-Morley null result demands. This length reduction is produced by the interaction 
between moved matter and the ether. The resting ether compresses the body in passage through it, 
and this contraction precisely compensates the effect of the motion on the measurement of electro-
magnetic quantities. As a result of this double influence, no effect of the motion on the moved body 
will be registered (Lorentz 1899, 268-270; Drude 1900, 482; McCormmach 1970, 47-48; Nerses-
sian 1986, 224; Schaffner 1972, 113; see Carrier 2001b, sec. 3). 
Lorentz succeeded in deriving the contraction hypothesis from the principles of his theory 
by drawing on the additional assumption that the intermolecular forces that were supposed to hold 
a body together and were thus responsible for the body’s dimensions transform like electromagnetic 
forces. This assumption is made plausible by the notion that these intermolecular forces are similar 
in kind to electromagnetic forces or even of the same nature. Lorentz did not rule out the existence 
of tangible effects of the motion of bodies through the ether. Only “many” electromagnetic phe-
nomena were thought to appear in the same way irrespective of the observer’s state of motion 
(Schaffner 1974, 48). In addition, Lorentz’s theory entailed that the frame of reference at rest in the 
ether was distinguished among the class of inertial frames in that it alone yields the true measures of 
lengths and velocities. The motion through the ether distorts spatiotemporal quantities. An optics 
textbook of the period put it this way: 
Another way of explaining the negative results of Michelson’s experiment has been 
proposed by Lorentz and Fitzgerald. These men assume that the length of a solid 
body depends upon its absolute motion in space. (Drude 1900, 481) 
On the other hand, the motion produces further effects that precisely offset the initial dis-
tortion—at least in “many” relevant phenomena. Lorentz’s account involves a sort of conspiracy 
among different factors brought forth by the motion of charged bodies. These factors are so con-
trived as to cancel each other out, concealing in this way the true motion of bodies from the unbe-
fitting curiosity of human observers. 
While it is true that Einstein worked out his special theory of relativity within the electrody-
namic program and as a revision of Lorentz’s theory (McCormmach 1970, 74; see Darrigol 1996, 
242-243), full-fledged special relativity is conceptually distinct from Lorentz’s account. There is 
historical continuity, to be sure, but the end-product of Einstein’s struggle with classical electrody-
namics was markedly different from its Lorentzian ancestor. In spite of their common origin and 
their close historical ties, the conceptual resources invoked in both accounts exhibit semantic in-
commensurability. 
6In contradistinction to Lorentzian electrodynamcis, Einstein’s relativity theory proceeds 
from the so-called special principle of relativity which says that all inertial frames of reference are 
equivalent in every physical respect. As a part of classical mechanics, this principle had long been
accepted . But the version suggested by Einstein was supposed to include electrodynamic proc-
esses; it implied that there is no privileged rest frame for electromagnetic phenomena. It follows 
that there are no absolute velocities; all velocities are relative to other bodies or frames of reference. 
The second axiom Einstein cites is the constancy of the velocity of light which says that the velocity 
of light is independent of the velocity of the light source. This constancy axiom follows from Max-
well’s theory; it is a theorem of pre-relativistic electrodynamics. The special principle and the con-
stancy axiom together imply the invariance of the velocity of light according to which this velocity 
assumes the same value for all inertially moved observers. The special principle of relativity entails 
that the inertial motion of a system of charged bodies or of an observer has no impact on electro-
magnetic processes. That is, Einstein abolished both the distorting influence of the motion and the 
counteracting factor. According to special relativity, all inertial frames are equivalent right from the 
start; their equivalence does not require the action of a compensating mechanism. 
Special relativity likewise entails a contraction of moved bodies. In fact, Einstein’s formula 
precisely agrees with Lorentz’s; both give the same ratio of length reduction for a moved body. But 
in spite of their mathematical identity, the Lorentzian and Einsteinian equations differ in meaning. 
Their semantic difference is rooted in the divergent understanding of “velocity” in both sets of 
equations. For Lorentz it means “absolute velocity,” that is, velocity of the relevant body with re-
spect to the ether rest frame. But for Einstein there is no such rest frame. The velocity in question 
is rather the relative velocity between body and observer. 
This contrasting understanding has important ramifications. Consider a body and an ob-
server moved at different speeds and assume that the observer registers a contraction of the body’s 
dimensions. It follows from Lorentzian electrodynamics that viewed from the angle of the moved 
and seemingly shortened body, the observer should appear expanded. After all, the moved body is 
compressed by the passage through the ether, and any length measurement using such shortened 
rods as standard should create the impression of expanded bodies. But on the basis of the principle 
of relativity, no states of absolute motion are admitted. Relative velocity is all that counts. Conse-
quently, judged from Einstein’s perspective, the observer should appear contracted as well. All that 
can be said is that the two bodies are in relative motion so that they are both subject to length con-
traction. This means that Lorentz-contraction proper is asymmetric whereas Einstein-contraction is 
reciprocal. These considerations suggest the existence of significant conceptual discrepancies be-
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7hind the superficial, specious identity of the formulas. I take a closer look at the relevant conceptual 
relations in the following section.  
4. Incommensurable Quantities in Classical Electrodynamics and 
Special Relativity 
The challenge is to give appropriate translations for Lorentzian concepts in terms of special 
relativity and vice versa. The spatiotemporal and dynamic measures in each theory constitute candi-
dates for translation. Thus, the issue is whether counterparts for concepts like length, duration, ve-
locity, and mass can be specified in the two theories at hand. I leave temporal quantities out of con-
sideration. The reason is that Lorentz retained universal time but later learned from Einstein that it 
is his local time, rather than universal time, that the clock readings provide. Even after this recogni-
tion, however, Lorentz endeavored to stick to universal time and never reached a clear position in 
this matter. Unlike time dilation, Lorentz clearly endorsed length contraction and his pertinent for-
mula agrees mathematically with Einstein’s. 
The issue, then, is translation. As I argued earlier, in light of the theoretical context account, 
a translation has to preserve the application conditions and the inferential relations of a term (see 
sec. 2). Let’s see how prima-facie translations fare in light of these requirements. 
The first attempt is to focus on conditions of application and to translate according to equal-
ity of measuring procedures: quantities that are determined empirically in the same way can be 
translated into one another. I won’t go into the details and simply state that length measurements 
based on rod transport or transmission time of light signals are equally accepted within both theo-
ries. That is, classical electrodynamics and special relativity roughly agree on the acceptability of 
length measurements. Measuring lengths by registering the round-trip travel time of a light signal, 
as it is done, for instance, in a Michelson-Morley setup is endorsed within the two accounts, and the 
results of the procedure are unanimously acknowledged as reliable. For Lorentz, the velocity of 
light would be altered by a possible motion of the observer, to be sure, but since the traversed 
spaces would change as well, the length ratios measured are trustworthy in any event. For Einstein, 
both the distortion and the counteraction are missing so that the procedure operates reliably any-
way. 
However, the inferential relations fail to be retained. The crucial divergence concerns the in-
terpretation of the relevant velocities. In Lorentz’s contraction formula the significant quantity is 
the velocity between the moved body and the ether; in Einstein’s mathematically identical equation 
the important magnitude is the velocity between the body and an observer. The disparate concep-
tual integration of the seemingly identical concepts of length and velocity becomes conspicuous 
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8once the relevant types of situation, as they emerge in the Lorentzian framework, are reconsidered 
in Einsteinian terms. 
(1) Lorentzian situation: body and observer are equally at rest in the ether: no contraction. 
Einsteinian reconsideration: body and observer are at relative rest: no contraction. 
(2) Lorentzian situation: the body is in absolute motion, the observer is at rest in the ether: contrac-
tion of the body. 
Einsteinian reconsideration: body and observer are in relative motion: reciprocal contraction. 
(3) Lorentzian situation: the observer is in absolute motion, body is at rest in the ether: contraction 
of the observer issuing in an apparent spatial dilation of the body. 
Einsteinian reconsideration: body and observer are in relative motion: reciprocal contraction.
(4) Lorentzian situation: both body and observer are in equal absolute motion: shrinkage of both 
body and observer but no net effect due to compensation (Michelson-Morley situation). 
Einsteinian reconsideration: body and observer at relative rest: no contraction. 
The Lorentzian and Einsteinian approaches differ in judgment as to whether or not contraction oc-
curs in a particular type of situation. 
Items #2 and #3 bring out the contrast between asymmetric Lorentz-contraction proper and 
reciprocal Einstein-contraction. If a moved body appears contracted to an observer, it is the ob-
server which moves as viewed from the perspective of the seemingly shortened body. The relativity 
principles entail that the observer appears contracted, he does not look stretched. This is different 
for Lorentz-contraction. Consider an observer moved with respect to the ether who measures the 
dimensions of a body at rest in the ether. In this situation, the observer’s extension is reduced so 
that he will register an increased length of the body. The body appears enlarged, not contracted. 
Regarding item #4, when an observer is moved along with a body so that the two are at relative 
rest, Lorentz contraction occurs, to be sure, but remains hidden because of an equal contraction of 
the measuring rods. By contrast, Einstein contraction is entirely absent under such circumstances.
Such differences in judgment indicate a change in the theoretical integration of the concept 
of length. Consider a case of curvilinear (but approximately rectilinear) motion such as the annual 
revolution of the Earth around the Sun. In Lorentzian terms, the change in the direction of motion 
entails that the body cannot be at rest in the ether all the time. This implies that contraction occurs. 
In special relativity, by contrast, this inferential tie is severed. The occurrence of a change of motion 
entails nothing as to contraction. All depends on the choice of the frame of reference. Conversely, 
whereas in special relativity the introduction of such a frame in a particular state of motion is suffi-
cient for implying judgments as to the occurrence of contraction, no such unambiguous conse-
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needed for making clear assessments possible so that the relativistic connection between relative 
motion and contraction is lost. I conclude that characteristic inferential relations for the concept of 
length are different in the two theories. 
This first approach invoked sameness of measuring procedures as the basis for translation 
and involved the rule to retain as far as possible the conditions of application of the relevant terms. 
On this basis the electrodynamic concept of length appears roughly synonymous to the relativistic 
one. However, this translation rule fails to reproduce the relevant inferential relations. It falls short 
of underwriting adequate translations for this reason.
The second attempt is directed at the preservation of these inferential relations. The pursuit 
of this line of thought amounts to explicating the terms “velocity” and “contraction” by delineating 
the role they play in classical electrodynamics or special relativity, respectively. Adopting the rela-
tivistic point of view, one could say that Lorentzian velocities are no relative velocities but refer to 
the motion of a body with respect to the ether, and one could add that these absolute velocities are 
allegedly responsible for length contraction phenomena. However, adopting such a translation rule 
drastically changes the conditions of application of the translated concepts. According to special 
relativity, there is no such thing as absolute velocity or as ether-caused contraction (let alone the 
converse spatial dilation). If the Lorentzian concepts of velocity and length reduction are simply 
grafted upon relativity theory, these concepts become empty. They are no longer legitimately ap-
plied to any phenomenon. The retention of the inferential relations is purchased at the expense of 
losing the conditions of application. This second approach also fails to provide an appropriate trans-
lation for this reason. 
The relationship between electromagnetic and relativistic mass constitutes a second, analo-
gous example. According to the so-called electromagnetic mass concept, the inertial properties of 
bodies arise at least partially from the interaction between charges and fields. In this vein, Lorentz 
distinguishes between “real” and “total” mass. Real mass is of mechanical origin and invariantly 
characterizes a given body. Total mass is real mass together with a variable increase in the inertia of 
a charged body in motion as a result of its interaction with the ether (Miller 1981, 46-47). Total 
mass governs the dynamic behavior of a body. Analogously, special relativity introduces rest mass 
and relativistic mass. Rest mass, like real mass, is an invariant characteristic of a body. Relativistic 
mass comprehends rest mass and a variable increase in inertia as a result of the relative motion of a 
body. Relativistic mass, like total mass, determines the dynamic behavior of a body. Further, the 
dependence of relativistic mass on rest mass and velocity is mathematically identical to the depend-
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ence of total mass on real mass and velocity. In addition, mass is evaluated in the same way in the 
two accounts in question. They both endorse determining mass values using a balance or collision 
processes (thereby drawing on momentum conservation). Therefore, the theoretical integration of 
the Lorentzian and Einsteinian mass concepts coincide in some respect and the conditions of appli-
cation agree, too. Accordingly, it appears that Lorentz’s “total mass” and Einstein’s “relativistic 
mass” are corresponding quantities, and that Lorentz’s “real mass” and Einstein’s “rest mass” are 
conceptually analogous as well. 
However, there are other features of the theoretical integration of these concepts of mass 
that differ considerably. Lorentz’s real mass is assumed to become manifest when the relevant body 
is at rest with respect to the ether. Einstein’s rest mass, by contrast, is obtained by an observer at 
rest relative to the body. Analogously, the value of total mass is supposed to be determined by the 
velocity of the body with respect to the ether, while the value of relativistic mass is assumed to de-
pend on the difference between the velocities of body and observer. Consider a charged body which 
is moved through the ether at the same speed as an observer. The electrodynamic judgment is that 
the mass of the body departs from its real value. It does so for all observers, and consequently also 
for the observer moved with the body. In relativity theory, by contrast, relative motion is all that 
matters, so that an observer at relative rest measures the body’s rest mass. Electrodynamics draws 
on total mass for capturing this situation, special relativity takes rest mass to be the relevant quan-
tity. Conversely, consider a body at rest in the ether as viewed from a moved observer. From the 
electrodynamic point of view, the dynamic behavior of the body is governed by its real mass 
whereas special relativity assumes that relativistic mass is the relevant magnitude. 
Underlying such differences in judgment is the divergent nomological integration of the 
mass concepts (which is veiled by the mathematical indistinguishability of the pertinent formulas). 
This divergence concerns the conception of the relevant velocities. Lorentzian electrodynamics 
takes the velocity between body and ether as the crucial parameter; Einsteinian special relativity 
assumes the velocity between body and observer to be of critical importance. As a result of this 
discrepancy in the nomological integration, the inferential relations between the mass concepts and 
other theoretical magnitudes disagree. For instance, the information that body and observer are in 
relative motion makes it impossible to employ the concept of rest mass in order to account for the 
situation. Within a Lorentzian framework, nothing of this sort follows. In particular, it is not ruled 
out to invoke the supposedly analogous concept of real mass. Namely, the body might be at rest 
and the observer in motion. The Einsteinian inferential bond is missing in Lorentz.
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This consideration shows that these allegedly intertranslatable concepts are used differently. 
Actually, the semantic features can be expressed in analogy to the above-mentioned relations 
among spatial quantities. The attempt to translate concepts from disparate theories leaves one with 
the choice between two equally unacceptable alternatives. The first one is to translate according to 
the relevant conditions of application. That is, the two terms are applied under the same circum-
stances. The catch is that the corresponding predicates do not exhibit the same inferential relations. 
In contradistinction to special relativity, classical electrodynamics does not license any relevant in-
ference to be drawn from the fact that body and observer are in relative motion. The second option 
is to translate such that the inferential relations are retained. This amounts to giving a description of 
ether-based electrodynamics. But the mass concepts specified in this framework are empty from a 
relativistic perspective: there is no motion relative to the ether. Thus, the conditions of application 
fail to be preserved. On the whole, then, the mass concepts in classical electrodynamics are inc-
ommensurable with the mass concepts in special relativity (see Carrier 2001b, sec. 4). 
5. Incommensurability, Split-Up of Natural Kinds and Shifts in Reference 
Kuhn featured shifts in the assumed similarity relations as the primary characteristic of in-
commensurability. He claimed that the discrepancy between the taxonomies of natural kinds is the 
chief obstacle to translation (Kuhn 1983, 683; see Hoyningen-Huene 1989, 211-212). Such kind-
terms denote classes of entities that are judged to be of the same kind in light of a theory (see sec. 
3). Incommensurable theories introduce partially overlapping classes of natural kinds. Such theories 
agree in judgments about the sameness in kind of some of the relevant entities, but disagree as to 
the sameness in kind of others. The shift toward a novel theory, incommensurable with the received 
one, produces a reshuffle of the classes of natural kinds. Such classes are torn into pieces, and the 
debris is reassembled to form novel, disparate classes. What is considered as being of the same na-
ture before a revolution may be regarded as different afterward. Conversely, what was thought to 
be different in kind may be taken as being alike in the new theory. It follows that two items which 
fall under the same category in one account are possibly to be expressed using different concepts in 
the other account. And two items labeled distinctly in one approach might be designated using the 
same concept in the other approach. Partial overlap or cross-classification of this sort vitiates trans-
lation and generates incommensurability (Kuhn 1990, 4; see Irzik & Grünberg 1995, 299). 
This cross-over of equivalence relations is manifest in the list of Einsteinian reconsiderations 
of Lorentzian types of situations (see sec. 4). Ties of similarity are unraveled, and others are estab-
lished in their stead. For instance, from a Lorentzian perspective, a body in absolute motion regis-
tered by an observer at rest in the ether (situation-type #2) is of the same type as a situation in 
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which both body and observer are in equal absolute motion (the Michelson-Morley situation #4). 
The two situations are equally characterized by a contraction of the body—although it fails to be-
come manifest if the observer is moved with the body. From Einstein’s point of view, by contrast, 
the two situations are distinct in kind in that relative motion, and consequently contraction, is only 
present in the former, but not in the latter. Conversely, in Einstein’s framework all states of affairs 
that involve a relative motion between body and observer are of the same type (situations #2 and 
#3). By contrast, against the backdrop of Lorentz’s theory, it makes a difference whether the body 
or the observer is in motion. The observer will register a contraction if the body is moved but a dila-
tion if she is in motion herself. 
This consideration brings to the fore the Kuhnian partial overlap of kind-terms. In Lorentz, 
situation-type #4 is considered similar to situation-type #2, whereas in Einstein, situation-type #3 is 
taken to be so related to situation-type #2. The first natural kind is “being in absolute motion,” the 
second is “being in relative motion.” Both the Lorentzian and the Einsteinian kind-terms contain 
situation-type #2, but otherwise include different circumstances. This exemplifies that disparate 
systems of laws can tie different states of affairs together. Conflicting theories tend to collect no-
mologically relevant properties into incompatible classes of natural kinds. 
The same reasoning applies to mass. In the Lorentzian framework, situations of the same 
type are characterized by equality of body velocity with regard to the ether—irrespective of the 
motion of the observer. Such Lorentzian kinds are dissolved in relativity theory through the intro-
duction of the motion relative to an observer as the salient quantity. Conversely, Einstein forged 
other relations of natural kinds instead. Situations of the same type are characterized by equal ve-
locity with regard to an observer—irrespective of the motion relative to the ether. That is, what was 
formerly conceptually united crumbled into separate pieces. And what was considered distinct pre-
viously was integrated conceptually. 
Incommensurable concepts emerge if, owing to nomological change, natural kinds are re-
structured. If a new system of laws is adopted that conflicts with a previous one, the former equiva-
lence classes split up into heterogeneous components and realign to form new taxonomic struc-
tures. This change of the class of properties to which a concept is rightly applied goes back to a 
change in the nomological integration of this concept. The use of electrodynamic and relativistic 
concepts is governed by contrasting sets of laws. It is this nomological contrast that constitutes the 
ultimate reason for the translation failure. The dissolution and the new formation of natural kinds 
which is placed at center stage by Kuhn is a proximate reason that follows from the divergence of 
the relevant inferential relations. 
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6. Empirical Comparison of Theories with Incommensurable Concepts 
Meaning discrepancy due to nomological divergence has a wider impact on the notion of 
scientific rationality. It affects the understanding of scientific progress and empirical comparison. 
Most linguistic theories accept the principle that meaning determines reference. Given this connec-
tion, a change in meaning suggests a shift in reference. Consequently, incommensurable concepts 
are likely to differ in reference. Barring the occurrence of coextensional terms like “rational ani-
mal” and “featherless biped,” theory change goes along with reference change so that the successor 
theory says different things about different objects—rather than different things about the same ob-
jects. This feature would certainly undermine a cumulative view of scientific progress. Progress 
could not be regarded as involving a better understanding of the same entities. 
Incommensurability appears to threaten, in addition, the comparability of the empirical 
achievements of rivaling theories. Without a common referential ground, no overlap among the 
empirical findings and problems can be identified—or so it seems. Incommensurability appears to 
rule out any agreement as to which problems are to be tackled and which facts are relevant. Actu-
ally, it is not even clear whether the theories at hand are competing with one another. A competi-
tion requires sameness of reference; competing theories entail divergent predictions about the same 
entities. But in the case of incommensurable theories, as the argument runs, sameness of reference 
can never be ascertained. 
The line of reasoning leading from translation failure to the exclusion of empirical compari-
son roughly runs as follows. Non-translatability implies that the content of one theory cannot be 
expressed within the conceptual framework of the other. But if it remains obscure what the alleg-
edly rival theory says, there is no way to judge if it agrees or conflicts with the theoretical assump-
tions under scrutiny. If comparison of content is ruled out, no comparison of the pertinent empirical 
consequences can be accomplished. 
In fact, however, empirical comparison remains a live option. Incommensurable theories 
need to be comparable in some respect in order to generate a non-trivial translation problem in the 
first place. A host of theories is not translatable into one another without anything significant com-
ing out of it. Lorentzian electrodynamics cannot be expressed using concepts from Darwin’s theory 
of natural selection, special relativity cannot be translated into game theoretical vocabulary. This is 
a rather unexciting feature. In order for non-translatability to become a non-trivial issue at all, such 
cases need to be excluded. The obvious way to do this is to draw on one of the defining features of 
incommensurability, namely, incompatibility of the laws involved. Incommensurable concepts are 
untranslatable since the relevant laws, as specified within each of the theories at hand, contradict 
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one another (see sec. 1). But no such incompatibility occurs in anyone of the just-mentioned cases 
(Feyerabend 1972, 304; Hoyningen-Huene 1989, 213). 
But a conflict between two theories only emerges if there is some shared realm which they 
jointly address. The non-triviality of incommensurability requires that there is some range of phe-
nomena that can be considered relevant for both theories. This common ground is sufficient for 
making empirical comparison possible. Consider a particular experiment for which both theories 
claim responsibility. Each of them captures the outcome by using its own observational vocabulary. 
Assume that the outcome is such that it is justified, on the basis of one account, to conclude that a 
certain process, as specified in terms of this account, has actually taken place, while it is illicit, on 
the basis of the rivaling theory, to judge that the process required by this theory has occurred. The 
experiment and its result are described within the conceptual frameworks of each of the theories 
involved. 
The series of experiments Walter Kaufmann conducted between 1901 and 1905 constitutes 
an example. Kaufmann’s experiments were intended to measure the dependence of the mass of elec-
trons upon their velocity. Considered with hindsight, they were relevant for the relativistic depend-
ence of mass on velocity—although they issued in the erroneous refutation of this dependence (Hon 
1995, 194-195; Cushing 1998, 210-215). 
Mass in Lorentz and mass in Einstein are incommensurable quantities (see sec. 5). Still, 
Kaufmann’s findings were taken to be relevant for both classical electrodynamics and special rela-
tivity. The measurement was performed by registering electron trajectories in electromagnetic 
fields. The electron paths were detected using a photographic plate. Kaufmann managed to obtain a 
visible curve on the plate whose precise shape was supposed to indicate the sought-for quantity. 
This effect was positively identified irrespective of the theoretical background. The reliability of the 
result was contentious, to be sure; actually, it was abandoned later. But this issue had nothing to do 
with the dissent as to the overarching background principles. Lorentzians and Einsteinians had no 
trouble identifying the traces left by incident electrons. 
Another case in point is the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment of 1932 which constituted a re-
finement of the Michelson-Morley experiment and was undertaken so as to compare Lorentz’s and 
Einstein’s theories empirically. Lorentz’s account entailed a negative result of the Michelson-Mor-
ley experiment only on the condition that the lengths of the interferometer arms were equal (when 
unaffected by the motion through the ether). Only under such circumstances, the changes in the 
velocity of light induced by the motion of the observer and the contraction of optical apparatus can-
celed each other out precisely. Interferometers equipped with unequal arms, by contrast, should 
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exhibit a net effect. Electrodynamic theory yields an equation that connects the ensuing shift in the 
interference fringes with the difference in the lengths of the interferometer arms (resting in the 
ether) and the velocity of the apparatus with respect to the ether. The prediction was that if these 
two quantities did not vanish, a shift should occur during the seasonal change in the direction of the 
Earth’s motion. The reason is that however the Earth moves precisely through the ether, it cannot 
be at rest all the time (see sec. 4; French 1968, sec. 3.1, 3.6). 
The partisan of classical electrodynamics may feel free to determine the relevant quantities 
in whichever way she prefers. The point is that the circumstances can easily be arranged such that 
her theory entails the appearance of fringe shifts. The only thing she has to acknowledge is the un-
equality of the interferometer dimensions and the attribution of a non-vanishing absolute velocity to 
the Earth. The realization of the former condition can be left completely to her, the fulfillment of the 
latter follows from her theory. By contrast, the adherent of special relativity anticipates that no 
fringe shifts occur. From his point of view, the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment is but a trivial modi-
fication of the Michelson-Morley experiment so that the same null result can safely be expected. As 
it turned out, the prediction of the latter was confirmed and the expectation of the former disap-
pointed. 
The crucial aspect is that the success or failure of the empirical test may be judged against 
the background of one’s own commitments and standards. No need for translation arises. A theory 
may well be tested by its own followers, and to them the relevant claims are by no means obscure.1
To be sure, it is necessary that a shared realm of relevant phenomena is recognized. Advocates of 
each theory have to acknowledge responsibility for coping with these phenomena (which may be 
disparately understood in either theory). But this much of a common ground is secured by the mere 
fact that we are dealing with incommensurable theories. 
7. Theoretical Contrast and Partial Overlap of Natural Kinds 
These considerations make the relations between incommensurable concepts more perspicu-
ous. The translation failure arising between incommensurable concepts is of a particular sort. It is 
based on incompatibility rather than unrelatedness. Within the theoretical context account of mean-
ing two constraints guide translations: empirical indications and theoretical integration have to co-
incide. Synonymous concepts need to apply to the same observations or situations and need to be 
1 Intersubjective control of theories containing incommensurable concepts is still feasible. Kuhn 
rightly distinguishes between translation and language acquisition (Kuhn 1983, 676-677). It is a 
consequence of the context account that concepts can be learned by familiarizing oneself with the 
pertinent theoretical context. One may become bilingual—and yet be at a loss to translate. It fol-
lows that the empirical comparison of theories with incommensurable concepts can be performed 
by a single person (Carrier 2001a, 85–86). 
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embedded at the same time in nomological frameworks exhibiting the same structure. Incommen-
surable concepts are distinguished by the fact that there is some agreement on both counts. In order 
to qualify as prima-facie analogs and candidates for translations, such concepts need to be applica-
ble to some shared domain and display some relatedness as to theoretical integration. I underscored 
earlier that incommensurable concepts do not satisfy both these demands. But the converse aspect 
deserves emphasis as well: Incommensurable concepts exhibit a particular type of relationship to 
one another; they are connected with one another by empirical or theoretical ties. This sort of con-
nectedness makes translation failure due to incommensurability a distinctive notion.
Let me explore these connections a bit more thoroughly. Kuhn’s notion of a partial overlap
among the referents of incommensurable concepts provides a basis for further clarification. This 
notion suggests that incommensurable concepts need to share some domain of application, on the 
one hand, but that this core domain is expanded in different ways for each of the conceptual coun-
terparts in question, on the other. This means that incommensurable concepts do not denote pre-
cisely the same states of affairs. There is a shared realm of application and there are deviations. 
Take the Lorentz-Einstein example. Although the two theories accept the same measuring proce-
dures for spatiotemporal and mass relations, the predictions regarding these relations do not always 
agree. Rather, as I argued before, differences in judgment about the prevailing length relations ob-
tain. It makes a difference, after all, whether the expected contraction relations are reciprocal or 
asymmetric (see sec. 4-5). 
The point is, then, that these divergent anticipations cannot be brought into harmony be-
cause of an underlying theoretical dissent. Lorentzian electrodynamics and Einsteinian special rela-
tivity disagree over the appropriate natural kinds (see sec. 5). The accepted relations of similarity 
diverge in both accounts, with the result that it is impossible to define conceptual analogs of Lor-
entzian spatiotemporal and mass terms in Einstein’s theory. It is a distinctive feature of incom-
mensurability that the relevant classificatory discrepancies resist reciprocal adaptation because they 
arise from fundamental theoretical divergence. Non-translatability due to incommensurability is not 
the result of a simple conceptual gap. Incommensurability is not about an accidentally missing 
word; it is rather about an in-principle rift. Underlying incommensurability is a theoretical dissent 
which makes it impossible to conceive an ersatz concept that could play the empirical and theoreti-
cal role of a term of the other theory in question. There is no way to define a something akin to 
“absolute motion” or “total mass” in special relativity short of running into a contradiction with the 
principles of this theory. Consequently, not any old taxonomical disagreement is sufficient for pro-
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ducing incommensurability. Rather, the relevant sort of disagreement needs to be induced by theo-
retical contrast and resist easy resolution. 
Consider Kuhn’s own example of a shift in meaning and reference of the concept “planet” as 
a result of the Copernican Revolution. Geocentrically speaking, “planet” means celestial body rotat-
ing around the Earth. Mars, Sun and Moon equally qualify as planets in this sense while the Earth 
does not. Heliocentrically speaking, “planet” means celestial body revolving around the Sun. Ac-
cording to this changed understanding, Earth and Mars pass as planets, while neither Sun nor Moon 
do. These changes in meaning are intertwined with a shift in the taxonomy of the relevant bodies. 
Geocentrically, Mars, Sun and Moon form part of the same natural kind, whereas the Earth was 
placed in a different category. After the revolution, Earth and Mars were equal in kind, while Sun 
and Moon shifted in kind in becoming a star and a satellite, respectively. The members of the geo-
centric kind “planet” were scattered into distinct taxa and placed alongside entities which were for-
merly taken to be of heterogeneous nature (Kuhn 1962, 115, 128-129; Kuhn 1987, 8). 
This example of Kuhn’s regarding incommensurable concepts illustrates, first, that such 
concepts share a core domain of application. A large number of geocentric planets are also helio-
centric planets and vice versa. Second, this core domain is expanded differently for the two con-
cepts. Geocentric planets include the Sun and the Moon, heliocentric planets instead encompass the 
Earth. It follows that the two domains of application overlap only partially. Third, this classificatory 
discrepancy resists resolution because of the underlying theoretical contrast. It is this contrast which 
makes it impossible to reciprocally assimilate the two domains and to apply the concept indiscrimi-
nately to all entities in question. This incompatibility between the theories involved lies at the root 
of incommensurability. 
8. Conclusion 
There are three conclusions to be drawn from these considerations. First, incommensurabil-
ity is real. The notion can coherently be reconstructed and positive instances of theories with inc-
ommensurable concepts can be specified. Second, incommensurability does not pose a serious 
threat to the objectivity of science or its commitment to experience. In order to make their concep-
tion non-trivial, advocates of incommensurability have to grant—in contrast to their declared inten-
tion—that empirical comparison of theories with incommensurable concepts is possible. Third, in-
commensurability is of lasting importance as a problem in the philosophy of language. Incom-
mensurability gives rise to the translation problem associated with the context account of meaning. 
It constitutes the successor problem to Quine’s indeterminacy of translation. Whereas Quine’s claim 
was based on the verification theory of meaning, Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s views emerge within the 
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context account. And whereas Quine is prepared to accept a large number of distinct but equally 
appropriate translations, Kuhn and Feyerabend suggest that there is not a single adequate rendering. 
Thus, basis and substance of the two positions are fairly disparate. Incommensurability is the fol-
low-up paradox of translation which continues to haunt us after the demise of verificationism. 
Fourth, in one respect incommensurability continues to be of epistemic significance. My argument 
does nothing to defuse the above-mentioned worry that incommensurability contributes to under-
mining a cumulative view of scientific progress according to which science manages incessantly to 
pile up truths upon one another. The lesson incommensurability teaches is that in the course of the-
ory change, scientific achievements may be conceptually reframed beyond recognition. In particular, 
the occurrence of reference shifts poses a serious threat to the claim that scientific theories accom-
plish an ever deeper understanding of the same objects and processes. In this respect the incom-
mensurability thesis retains some epistemic significance after all. 
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